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- Economic and Political Integration: Europe and the Americas 
Purpose of Paper 
As states have coalesced into regional organizations, the contemporary global political -
economy has seen the emergence of three powerful blocs. First, centered on the wealthy states 
- of North America, the American bloc spans North, Central, and South America. Second, the 
European bloc, centered on highly industrialized countries in Western Europe, the European bloc -
includes Eastern European states and some Eurasian states. Finally, an Asian bloc has emerged 
- in the past half-century around rapidly industrialized Japan. 
- This paper will focus on the first two powers-the American bloc and the European bloc. 
In the past century, both regions have dramatically changed composition. On the economic 
- level, Europe progressed from a fragmented mass of states to a cohesive group that acts as a 
- whole. Along the path to economic integration, European states also progressed toward political 
integration. 
- The American bloc has not attained the level of integration that Europe has achieved; yet 
- it has taken important steps in that direction. Intra-regional markets have opened up, liberalizing 
trade between the members. Politically, the region has founded the Organization of American - States, a multilateral organization through which individual states can voice their concerns. 
- At first glance, several differences between the two blocs are apparent. Differences 
between these two blocs are best illustrated through the history of their integration. This paper - will look at integration in the two blocs and attempt to discern exactly how integration differs 
_ between them. It will address motives and methods for integration and attempt to predict the 























Background: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation 
After the Second World War, the United States emerged as the pre-eminent global power. 
The United States had not suffered the casualties that plagued other participants in the conflict, 
and, with the exception of Pearl Harbor, its territory was relatively unscathed by the war. In fact, 
the war aided the United States by pulling it out of the vast depression that started in 1929. With 
almost fifty percent of world GNP, the US economy dwarfed the post-war economies of other 
states. In certain sectors, such as crude petroleum production, the US output exceeded the output 
of all other states combined. (See Figure 1, "Economic Role of the United States in 1950.,,)1 
Figure 1 Economic Role of the United States in 1950 
• Produced 17% of the world's wheat 
• US exports accounted for 18% of world trade 
• Produced 42% of the world's iron ore 
• Produced 45% of the world's crude steel 
• Held 49% of international financial reserves 
• Produced 53% of the world's crude petroleum 
• Almost 50% of world GNP produced within the United States 
Source: Rosati, p. 52 . 
Continuing prosperity throughout the fifties caused many to speculate that the United 
States would remain an uncontested superpower throughout the twentieth century. The 
following decade demonstrated that not to be the case. Formerly war-ravaged states rebuilt their 
industrial and banking sectors with unbelievable rapidity. Germany and Japan, in particular, 
rehabilitated at an unprecedented rate. Analysts were keenly aware that US improvements were 
not keeping pace with the growth of foreign economies. Soviet technology and influence began 
I Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 





















to threaten the United States, which saw itself as lagging dangerously behind. According to 
realists, who see state power as a zero-sum game,2 the relative increase in European and Soviet 
power caused a relative decrease in US power. The result was the perception of parity between 
the United States and Soviet Union, with Europe not far behind.3 
The situation resulting from the US-USSR conflict is a classic example of tight 
bipolarity. According to balance of power theory, some states seek to gain regional or global 
hegemony. Feeling their security threatened by the rise of a strong state, states that are smaller 
or weaker band together to counter the expanding power of the strong state. Their goal is to keep 
anyone state from obtaining a monopoly of international power. In the example of the post-
World War II era, the United States emerged as a hegemonic power. The Soviet Union soon 
rose to challenge US hegemony. Instead of the unipolar, US-dominated system, the international 
community became a bipolar system. 
The United States mutually feared that the other state would come to dominate the 
international system. The Soviet Union declared spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and 
Asia. In response to possible Soviet pre-eminence, the United States banded together with other 
Western democracies, Japan, and South Korea. It declared its own spheres of influence in 
Central and South America. The result, as mentioned earlier, was a rigidly bipolar system: the 
US-led bloc opposed to the USSR-led bloc. The apparent standoff between these two 
superpowers led to a scramble for each to enforce its own ideology on other states. 
2 The zero-sum game is a notion that comes from Game Theory in International Relations. The central tenet is that 
there is a set amount of world power. The power of anyone state is determined relative to other states. States 
divide this power as one would divide a cake-a larger slice for one state means a smaller slice for another state. 
The opposing idea is the "variable-sum" game, which holds that there is not a set amount of available power. 
According to this theory, it is possible for states to gain power at the same time. In other words, one state's gain in 
power does not necessarily mean another state's loss of power. 





















Both blocs were comprised of many weaker states in tight political alliance with the 
larger state. Two main goals convinced smaller states to ally with one superpower or the other. 
First, in some cases, the smaller states sought to balance against one of the superpowers. It could 
join with the state that espoused its ideals and slow the momentum of the one it opposed. 
Second, a small state could gain protection from the superpower to which it allied. 
On the other hand, larger states sought to add smaller states to their bloc as a means for 
preserving their own security. By holding them in a tight political or economic alliance, they 
could assure themselves that the states would not side with the enemy. This practice, unlike the 
former case, did not always cater to the will of the smaller state. The Soviet Union, in the 
process of liberating Eastern Europe from Nazism, incorporated a number of smaller states. 
Similarly, the United States rejected socialist and communist movements in Latin America, 
effectively incorporating Latin America into its capitalist system. 
In sum, the post-World War II era was ripe for economic and political integration. In 
fact, the Cold War created a system that encouraged capitalists and communists to disseminate 
their beliefs. Fearful that their states would actually cease to exist if they did not do otherwise, 
each camp sometimes turned to force in order to coerce states into political and economic 
integration. 
Theoretical Basis for Economic Systems: Why Integrate? 
The reasons less-developed countries (LDCs) typically engage in regional integration are 
clear. Ninety less developed countries have populations under fifteen million, and over sixty of 
those have populations under five million. When the citizens of these countries earn an income 





















than the market of certain cities in developed countries. The resulting economic problem is that 
the state is limited in the number of industries that can attain economies of scale.4 The term 
"economies of scale" indicates that output grows faster than input. If inputs increase by 25 
percent, for example, outputs increase more than 25 percent. In order to attain economies of 
scale, cost per unit of production must decline as more units are produced. 5 
Given these conditions, it may be impossible for an industry in a small state to grow large 
enough for the unit cost of production to decrease. (For that matter, it may be impossible for the 
industry to grow large enough to make net profits.) Therefore, small states view economic 
integration as a way to attain economies of scale. They can increase the size of the market for 
their goods, specialize in the good that they produce most efficiently, and increase the amount of 
affordable goods available to them from their trading partners. According to economic theory, 
removing imposed barriers to trade allows all parties to grow economically. 
Economic theory indicates that removing excess costs is the method by which all states 
can grow economically. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts that removing all 
barriers to trade will result in the elimination of excesses from the system. For example, when 
free trade makes it possible for other suppliers to offer their goods on a certain market, price 
competition ensues. Firms can no longer make excess earnings, termed profits. Since 
consumers have an option, the theory states, consumers will shop for the lowest prices. In the 
presence of competitors, therefore, firms must cut prices as low as possible in order to attract 
consumers to their product. In the end, each firm will charge only enough to cover its costs. The 
firm that can produce a good at the lowest opportunity cost, therefore, will be the one to survive. 
4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Central American Regional Integration (New York: The Carnegie Endowment of International 
Peace, 1967), p. 6-8. 





















That means the most efficient firm will be the only one to stay in business, which is assumed to 
be advantageous in economic theory.6 
According to the above reasoning, economic integration establishes an incentive for 
efficiency. In the same manner that companies seek to control their costs, economic integration 
demands that companies manage their resources efficiently. When firms that were once outside 
the trading area begin vying for the same resources, resources flow to the sector that produces 
the most output with them. In other words, the firm most capable of limiting the resources it 
requires will stay in business.7 
Economic integration also makes it easier for a state to offer a product that it produces 
efficiently. If a certain state had no trading partners, which would be virtually impossible in the 
real world, it would have to be totally self-sufficient and produce every good itself. That state 
will naturally produce some goods at lower cost than others. For instance, if the state lacks 
capital, it will have difficulty producing capital-intensive goods. On the other hand, if the 
country has a large population but small land area, it may struggle to produce enough food for its 
citizens. 
By making trade as free as possible across borders, the state casts off the responsibilities 
of a self-sufficient society. Not only can it attain products that it had no way of producing 
before, it can specialize in the goods it produces most efficiently. The Ricardian Comparative 
Advantage Theory of International Trade states exactly that principle. A state will choose to 
produce the one good for which it has a comparative advantage over other states. Even if 
Country A produces watches and cheese more cheaply than Country B can, it will choose to 
produce the good it produces most cheaply_ If Country A, with its skilled labor force and better 
6 Eithne Murpy, "Market, State, and Community," Core Issues in European Economic Integration, Eamon O'Shea 
and Michael Keane, eds., (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1999), pp. 22-3. 
- McCurry 7 
- assembly plants, can produce watches more cheaply than it can produce cheese, it will specialize 
in watch production and export watches to Country B. Country B, on the other hand, will - produce only cheese and export it to Country A. Since each state produces only the good in 
- which it has the comparative advantage, they both maximize their output. Both countries will 
produce more than they could under their former, non-integrated terms. - Large, developed states seek to integrate their economies for many of the same reasons; 
- however, large corporations often provide the impetus for integration. Businesses view 
economic integration as beneficial for three major reasons: 1) convenience, 2) efficiency, and 3) - growth. Economic integration is convenient because it allows companies to move products 
- across borders without the hassle of inspections or taxes. Manufacturers have greater access to 
resources such as raw materials and labor. Just as they are encouraged to be efficient in their - plant operations, integration encourages their suppliers to operate efficiently, meaning that they 
- may be able to obtain inputs at a lower cost than before integration. Finally, just as in small 
states, corporations in large states enjoy the profits of selling to a larger market. Even if they -
have already reached economies of scale, companies can nevertheless earn a larger profit by 
- increasing their consumer base. A number of economic systems represent the range of 
integration that member states can implement. This range, explained in Figure 2, is composed of -
the 
- • free trade area 
• customs union 
• common market - • economic union 
• monetary union. 
-
-























Figure 2 Economic Integration 
A free trade area is a union in which member states do not levy tariffs between 
themselves, but each nation reserves the right to set its own tariff on goods entering from 
outside the free trade area. Generally, there are low economic demands on the parties 
involved, that is, member states do not undergo great economic changes in the process of 
opening their borders to free trade. In addition, free trade areas require a low level of 
political cooperation between the states. They retain their individual sovereignty to levy 
tariffs against outside goods, so negotiation for a common outside tariff is not necessary. 8 
In customs unions, not only do members eliminate tariffs between themselves, 
they levy a common tariff against goods entering from outside the union. This type of 
economic union requires that states negotiate a common external tariff, which requires 
more economic and political cooperation between the states. All barriers to trade are still 
not lifted, however. States retain the right to impose nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as 
health or safety standards on goods coming from outside or from other member states. 
The common market requires more cooperation than does the customs union. 
For a common market, the member states must agree on common policies in areas that 
are not directly related to tariffs and trade. For example, they must declare similar 
policies on matters of "agriculture, transport, competition law, tax laws and regional 
policies.,,9 Naturally, harmonizing these policies requires economic and political 
cooperation. 
An economic union entails all the provisions of the customs union, as well as the 
free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services. Members must harmonize 
budgetary policies, monetary policies, and exchange rates. 
A monetary union entails guaranteeing the exchange rates of the menlber 
currencies, removing all restrictions on capital flows, and integrating financial and 
banking markets. A central bank manages a single monetary policy for all the members, 
and the individual currencies of the countries may be replaced by a single currency. 10 
8 David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to International Political Economy (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 
1996), P 219. 



















They are listed in order of least to greatest economic unity, so each successive union demands 
increased economic cooperation. Because the members must negotiate additional trade policies 
and policies related to trade (transport, agricultural, etc.), each level demands increased political 
cooperation. 
Evidence compiled from trade statistics generally proves the results of theoretical 
modeling. That is to say, corporations and consumers seem to gain from economic integration. 
They are able to find lower prices for goods, and industries are forced to run their businesses 
more efficiently. Corporations, especially large, profitable corporations enjoy the possibilities of 
expanding their markets and earning even more profits. 
Why then, does every country not band together into a tight economic alliance? It is 
possible to treat the range as a set of steps toward tighter integration, so, why is it that a state 
does not realize that each step produces more and more benefits, and therefore continue to 
integrate more and more fully? If the presented reasoning suggests that the most benefit would 
accrue from engaging every state in a monetary union, what keeps national governments from 
pursuing whole-heartedly this ideal? In fact, there are two explanations for states' behavior: 1) 
they depend on economics as a tool to maintain domestic well being, and 2) forging a high-level 
economic alliance demands that they relinquish a portion of political sovereignty. 
Monetary policy is one of the important tools a central government uses to control its 
well-being. For example, if unemployment rises in a state, the central government can pursue 
certain monetary policies to correct the problem. The government can raise the amount of 
money in circulation by printing more currency or by buying back government bonds. Either 






















to employ. Conversely, the central government could implement contractionary monetary policy 
in order to correct the problem of inflation in the state. 
Another example of monetary policy, more applicable to the integration question, is the 
ability of central governn1ents to devalue their currency. If, for some reason, world demand for 
Italian goods falls, Italian workers would suffer unemployment. One logical step that the Italian 
state could follow would be to devalue the lira. By doing so, Italian goods would appear cheaper 
and therefore more appealing to international consumers. They would buy more Italian goods, 
which would mean employment for Italian workers. The lira could return to its nonnal exchange 
rate after the demand shortage and unemployment problem subsided. 
The problem with monetary integration is that central governments lose the ability to 
perform either of these actions when they integrate with other states. II In a monetary union, a 
central bank determines how much currency the member states may print and controls exchange 
rates. Therefore, a state would suffer even harsher effects if the central bank demanded a policy 
that exacerbated the problem. By enforcing contractionary policy during a period of high 
unemployment, for instance, the central bank could cause inflation to increase. Problems such as 
these arise in situations where a single bank tries to coordinate policy for a number of states. 
Naturally, there will be times that some states experience inflation while others experience 
unemployment, so the central bank's policy will have a negative effect on one or the other. 
Theoretical Basis for Political Integration: Why not integrate? 
Losing certain economic powers can be damaging to a state, as demonstrated above. 
However, economic control has higher implications as welL Agreeing to a strong economic 
II Alison M.S. Watson, Aspects of European Monetary Integration: The Politics of Convergence (New York: St. 





















alliance requires a high degree of political cooperation. In fact, an economic alliance may 
determine certain political choices that normally fall into the realm of politics. Therefore, a 
state's leaders may feel that a strong economic alliance infringes on that state's sovereignty. 
It is undeniable that making treaties is an exercise of state sovereignty. 12 However, when 
states bind themselves to a certain agreement, they relinquish a portion of sovereignty as well. 
They are forced to bring domestic political issues into accord. One example of this fact is the 
case of Ireland's anti-abortion policy. As delegates to the Maastricht summit in the Netherlands 
finalized plans for the European Union, Irish courts were hearing the case of a fourteen-year-old 
rape victim who wanted an abortion. Unlike Ireland, most European states do not impose a ban 
on abortion. Irish pro-life lobbyists felt the threat of lost sovereignty in face of states that do not 
agree with its policy. 13 
Creating a monetary alliance seems to produce many benefits, but there are also serious 
disadvantages to the alliance. Furthermore, withdrawal from a monetary union is extremely 
difficult, especially when the economic union adopts a common currency. A state may find itself 
bound in a union that central planners mismanage. If the currency suffers devaluation or if the 
union suffers unemployment, a member state has no choice but to carry on with policies that may 
worsen its situation. 
A situation in which a state is bound to a disagreeable policy indicates that the state has 
given up some of its sovereignty. Sovereignty, at its most basic level, is the state's authority to 
act in its own self-interest. For some political theorists, preservation of state sovereignty is the 
12 This idea comes from the 1912 Wimbledon case in International Law. 
13 Joe Joyce, "Abortion Case Raises Fears for Maastricht Ratification," The Guardian (London), 25 February 1992, 





















Figure 3 What is Cooperation? 
Two Views on Cooperation Between States 
In International Relations theory there are many schools of thought that shape the way 
policymakers view relationships between states. Two of the oldest are Realism and Idealism, 
which present somewhat opposing views on the prospects of cooperation between states. 
At the heart of the argument for each is a fundamental difference in the way they view 
human nature. Realists believe that humans are "greedy, self-interested, fearful, [and] prestige-
hungry." 14 They are unable to change these basic characteristics, and the only power that can 
control these destructive values is a central governing force or prudence. 
Idealists, on the other hand, see human nature as an area in which progress towards 
goodness is possible. They hold that humans are "capable of either good or evil, greed or 
cooperation.,,15 Education, institutions, and laws can harness the negative characteristics and 
make cooperation more likely. 
Each system has its own beliefs about the status of the international system as well. 
Because realists are inclined to believe that people are self-interested and power-hungry, they 
posit that states, like humans, will always struggle to assert their dominance over one another. 
The international system has no hierarchical power over the states, meaning that there is nothing 
to force states to cooperate. In this anarchic system, states will pursue their own interests 
without regard for each other, making the international system a dangerous, chaotic place. 
Idealists reject the notion that people cannot band together to create trans-national 
institutions. These organizations, they believe, are the key to restraining the negative aspects of 
human behavior. By creating laws and institutions for states to follow, cooperation is possible. 
The fundamental values of idealists and realists have permeated International Relations 
theory. The result is several theories built on their basic tenets. Examples of these are Neo-
Liberal Institutionalism, a variation of Idealism, and Moderate Realism. 
14 Frances V. Harbour, Thinking About International Ethics: Moral Theory and Cases from American Foreign 












central goal of any state. According to these political theorists, policymakers have the 
responsibility of preserving state security, so they should not risk binding the state in a pact that 
could prove injurious. 
The school of thought that most often posits this reasoning is the realist school. (See 
Figure 3, "What is Cooperation? Two Views on Cooperation Between States.") In the extren1e 
form, they doubt the value of making alliances toward the end of increasing security. Realists 
are likely to point to the disagreeable, and even dangerous, effects of forging a tight union with 
another state. 
European Economic Integration 
The above section delineates cost-benefit analysis that a state considers before choosing 
to integrate with other states. The mentioned benefits, however, did not weigh as heavily in 










from the typical benefits a state seeks from integration. Instead, the Soviet threat during the Cold 
War provided the impetus for the economic union between Western European states. Since the 
end of World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had worked to establish 
Communist governments throughout the world. The effects of communism were particularly 
strong in Eastern Europe. Afraid that the Soviet Union would "Balkanize" Western Europe, the 
United States set up a plan to prevent Western Europe from falling to con1n1unism. 
The US response to the imposition of communism in Europe was the 1948 European 
Recovery Program (ERP). Proposed by US Secretary of State George Marshall, the plan took on 
the common name "Marshall Plan." It reflected the attitude of European and American leaders: 









The plan called for distribution of economic aid to all European states (even the Soviet 
Union) that would collaborate on a program for recovery. Russia and its satellites quickly 
declined the invitation, indicating that the United States sought to recreate Europe as a model of 
itself. Sixteen Western European nations eagerly joined the Marshall Plan. 
At first, Truman had difficulty raising support for the Secretary of State's plan, but the 
opposition would not hold out long. First, Marshall Plan opponents were embarrassed to have 
the American Communist Party among their ranks. Then, the sudden fall of Czechoslovakia to 
Communists convinced the majority to support the plan after all. In April 1948, Trunlan signed 
of four billion dollars. During the course of the next three years, the Marshall Plan would send 












In addition to supplying relief aid for the victims of the war, ERP provisions furnished a safe 
method for reintegrating Western Germany into Europe. Many realized the importance of 
rearming Germany in order to stave off a potential Soviet invasion; however, German force had 
proven dangerous to Europe before. The Americans felt that a close political tie with the rest of 
Europe would deter Germany from threatening any of its neighbors. The safety stipulation was 
important, and rejuvenating the German economy was essential to European recovery. Despite 
Allied damage to the state, most of Europe's intact industrial facilities still lay in Germany. 17 
The United States' insistence on these policies resulted partly from goodwill and partly 
from following its own interests. US policymakers had recently witnessed the disaster of the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act's brand of protectionism. They did not wish to see their European 
neighbors to suffer the same fate. US policymakers viewed multi-Iateralism and trade 
liberalization as the most important principles for economies to follow. Also, European 




















integration would provide markets and investment opportunities for US companies. In the post-
war period, the United States suffered a trade surplus and therefore sought a market with demand 
for its goods. For these reasons, the United States pressed Europe hard to establish economic 
integration, even making trade liberalization imperative through the ERP. 18 
US policymakers had become familiar with the innovative mass-production techniques of 
Henry Ford. For that reason, creating a customs union stood out to US policymakers as a 
method for rehabilitating European economy. By drawing on a larger market for goods, 
European firms could reap the financial benefits of economies of scale and mass-production. 
With increased freedom to move goods across borders, states could properly allocate resources to 
the most efficient sectors. Efficiency could in tum spur on technical advancement. 19 Technical 
advancement would then assure economic growth in Europe. 
One stipulation of the Marshall Plan was that Europe had to devise a mechanism for 
allocating the aid it received. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
created in 1948, occupied itself with this challenge. One of that organization's early decisions 
involved coal and steel allocation. Necessary for the industrial recovery of both France and 
Germany, the iron ore, coke, and steel deposits of the Ruhr Valley lay entirely in neither 
country's territory. France exported the majority of its iron ore deposits, yet suffered from the 
lack of coal and steel. Conversely, Germany lacked iron ore but had abundant coal and steel 
resources. This situation exemplified the need for resource allocation that the ERP advocated, 
and resulted in one of Europe's first important economic alliances.2o 
17 Bill Lucarelli, The Origins and Evolution of the Single Market in Europe (Aldershot, England: Ashgate 
Publishing, 1999), pp. 13-4, 21. 
18 Lucarelli, p. 21. 
19 Ibid. 





















In 1951, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West Germany) formed 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg had recently taken Europe's first step toward economic integration and created a 
customs union in 1948.21 France and Germany invited the new alliance, called Benelux, and 
Italy to join ECSC.22 (See "Chronology of European Economic Organizations.") 
The European Coal and Steel Community served as a common market between the six 
members. It saw an increase in output during the 1950s, the causes of which, admittedly, could 
not be entirely attributed to the common market. During that period, the general increase in 
world economic activity bolstered output as much as common market practices. The union 
suffered some problems as well. For instance, separating the coal and steel sectors from the rest 
of the economy was nearly impossible. Second, the union did not achieve political integration as 
its framers had hoped. Finally, the coal shortage of 1959 greatly weakened the Community and 
contributed greatly to its collapse. 23 
In reaction to the difficulty of separating out certain economic sectors for governance, the 
six ECSC states created the European Economic Community. The EEC began with the 1957 
Treaties of Rome, which simultaneously established the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). The guiding principle for the European Economic Community was inten1al trade 
liberalization. Beginning in 1958, member states eliminated customs duties and quotas between 
themselves. Euratom united Europe in matters of technical and nuclear power cooperation. It 
sought to encourage research, distribute technical information, institute safety standards, develop 
21 The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999 3d ed., (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1999): p. 
Xlll. 
22 Lucarelli, p. 36. 





















Chronology of European Economic Organizations 
Jan 1948: Customs union between Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
April 18, 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Member states: Belgium, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West 
Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Luxerrtbourg. 
March 25, 1957: Treaties of Rome establish 
the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or Euratom). Signed by France, 
FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. 
Feb 1959: Benelux Economic Union: 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
May 3, 1960: Stockholm Convention, 
comprising Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom, create the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). 
1964: Common agricultural market 
established. 
April 8, 1965: The Merger Treaty integrated 
the executives of the ECSE, EEC, and 
Euratom, establishing a single Council of 
Ministers and a single Commission. 
June 1, 1968: Customs union completed. 
All customs duties removed between 
Belgium, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. 
Oct 1970: Werner Report presented member 
governments with plan for full Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). 
1971: World monetary crisis disrupts EMU. 
Jan 22, 1972: United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark join the union. 
April 1972: EC sets up Snake monetary 
system. 
July 22, 1972: Austria, Portugal, Iceland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland sign Special 
Relations Agreements with EEC. 
May 14, 1973: Norway signs a free trade 
agreement with the EEC. 
Nov 20, 1979: Council of Ministers 
endorsed the Tokyo Round of negotiations 
for the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which further reduced customs 
duties. 
Jan 1, 1981: Greece became the tenth 
member of the EEC. 
Jan 1, 1986: Spain and Portugal became full 
members of the EC. 
Feb 17, 1986: Single European Act (SEA) 
signed by Belgium, France, FRG, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
Feb 28, 1986: SEA signed by Denmark, 
Greece, and Italy. 
1986: Adopted European Flag. 
July 1, 1987: SEA came into affect. 
June 1989: Delors Plan presented to Heads 
of Government. Stage One of EMU set for 
1 July 1990. 









5 Oct 1990: United Kingdom allowed 
sterling to become a full member of the 
ERM. 
Dec 1990: Uruguay Round of GATT broke 
down due to disagreements over EC 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Dec 1991: Maastricht Summit, European 
Council meeting in Maastricht, the 
Netherlands; reached an agreement on the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which 
included substantial revision of the Rome 
Treaties. 
1 Jan 1993: Internal market completed. 
1 Nov 1993: TEU entered into force. EC 
Member States became known as the 
European Union (EU). 











Source: The European Union Encyclopedia 
and Directory 1999. 
McCurry 18 
1 Jan 1995: Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
became menlbers of the EU. 
25 March 1998: Conference in London on 
enlargement of the EU. Commission 
recommended that 11 Member States 
participate in the EMU from the beginning: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom declined 
participation, and Greece failed to meet the 
convergence criteria. 
31 Dec 1998: Conversion rates between 
euro and 11 Member currencies irrevocably 
fixed. 
1 Jan 1999: Third stage of EMU began. 
Euro came into existence, replacing the 





















nuclear energy installations, monitor provisions of nuclear ores and fuels, supervise the use of 
radioactive materials, and advocate peaceful uses for nuclear energy.24 
In 1967, three related alliances-the European Coal and Steel Community (what 
remained of it), the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic 
Community-formally joined in order to form the European Community (EC). Under this 
umbrella, the EEC attained its goal of creating a customs union with the establishment of a 
common external tariff in 1968. 
The European Community defined the framework of what would later become the 
European Union. The Treaty of Rome laid out provisions for integrating the economies of the 
participants. It was highly successful in eliminating formal barriers to trade. Member states 
phased out all tariffs and quotas by July 1968, eighteen months ahead of schedule. The result 
was that labor, capital, goods, and services could flow more freely between the states. Because 
of the common external tariff set that same year, goods from non-nlernber states faced the same 
tariff no matter through which state they entered.25 
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Rome had some flaws that hindered the integration process. 
Namely, the Treaty did not specify steps for removing non-tariff barriers to trade. Not yet 
realizing this problem, the EC Heads of State or Government convened in The Hague in 1969. 
Their plan was to "deepen and widen the Community." 26 They sought to deepen the integration 
by eliminating non-tariff barriers and establishing a European Monetary Union by 1980. The 
Community would widen to include four more members: Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, and Ireland. (See Figure 4, "Expansion to the European Union.") 
24 The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.y. "EURATOM." 
25 Andrew Scott, "Economic Integration in the European Union," The European Union Encyclopedia and 
Dictionary: 1999, p. 138 





















Progress in the 1970s frustrated the framers. Although three of the invited members 
joined the organization (Norway refused), the task of eliminating non-tariff barriers proved more 
difficult than expected. The economic climate in the 1970s contributed to the difficulty. Early in 
the decade, the Bretton Woods exchange system fell through, making Western European and 
United States currencies unstable.27 
Figure 4 Expansion to the European Union 
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Austria, Finland, Sweden Membership 
Source: Andre Sapir, "Regional Integration in Europe," The Economic Journal 102 (November 1992): 1492. 










Delegates in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire had restructured the international currency 
system that had dominated before Wodd War II. Before, major currencies had determined their 
worth in terms of gold. In 1944, representatives at Bretton Woods decided that international 
currency exchange would no longer depend on gold as the core unit of exchange. Instead of 
determining each currency value in terms of gold and then establishing an exchange rate between 
them, currency rates would be stated in terms of dollars. Pegged to the dollar, each currency 
maintained a fixed exchange rate within a band one percent above or below its fixed exchange 
rate with the dollar.28 
Because all European Bank transactions took place in dollars, each central bank retained 
extensive dollar reserves. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, US external deficits resulted in even 
larger dollar reserves abroad. Naturally, European central banks began to doubt the ability of the 
- United States to back up its currency. 
The United States had its complaints regarding the Bretton Woods System as well. The - United States needed to devalue the dollar in order to alleviate unemployment problems. 
- However, because it was locked into a set exchange rate with European states there was no way 







promise gold for its foreign reserves. The Smithsonian Agreement stated this official policy 
change: that the United States would no longer redeem dollars with gold. Although official 
policies changed the system into a more relaxed exchange system, the Bretton Woods System 
effectively broke apart with President Nixon's announcement of the Smithsonian Agreement. 


















Exchange rates had fluctuated by one percent above or below the dollar in the Bretton 
Woods System. In order to devalue the dollar, Smithsonian delegates needed to implement a 
wider band of fluctuation. This system was not practical for European currencies, however. 
Under the new system, European currencies would be able to float 2.25 percent above or the 
dollar. This band implied an intra-European currency fluctuation of 4.5 percent.29 Even more 
troubling than a 4.5 percent difference in exchange rates, "under a 'crawling peg' regime, the 
spread between two EEC currencies could reach as high as 9 [percent] in the long term if one 
currency appreciated by the permitted 4.5 [percent] while another currency depreciated by the 
same magnitude. ,,30 In light of these possible problems, European states sought to tighten an 
economic union between themselves. Central banks, following a proposal by Prime Minister 
Pierre Werner of Luxembourg, narrowed the band in which their currencies could float against 
each other. They determined to maintain intra-European exchange rates within a band of 2.25 
percent and allow currencies to float against the dollar at a maximum difference of 4.5 percent. 
When graphed, this exchange rate system consisted of European currencies floating 
inside a narrow band, which was inside a wider band. For that reason, the economic system set 
up by Europe after the Bretton Woods Systen1 was called "the snake in the tunnel," or just "the 
snake." That is, the "snake" was the European countries allowed to fluctuate by 2.25 percent, 
and the "tunnel" was the 4.5 percent band outside the narrower band. Given the fact that the 
snake system accounted for both European currency fluctuation and an exchange rate with the 
29 When the US government failed to back the dollar by gold, the dollar devalued and European currencies revalued 
(appreciated). The German mark revalued by 13.5 percent; the Dutch guilder and Belgium franc revalued by 11.6 
percent; the French franc revalued by 8.6 percent, and the Italian lira by 7.5 percent in relation to the dollar. 
(Lucarelli, p. 84.) 
30 Lucarelli, pp. 84-5. 
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dollar, it was created to work alongside the Bretton Woods System. It would replace Bretton 
Woods, however, at its official collapse in 1973.31 
- The snake in the tunnel was Europe's first attempt at economic and monetary union. In 
- fact, the Werner Report was the first time that the term "economic and monetary union," or 
EMU, was used. The system faced difficulties, especially the oil crisis of 1973-74. During this - time, several currencies withdrew from the arrangement, notably, Britain and Ireland in 1972, 
- Italy in 1973, France in 1974 and then in 1976, and Norway in 1978. The plan fell through 
entirely in 1979.32 - Many states were hesitant to en1bark on another economically unifying venture in 
_ Europe. Dollar problems in 1978, however, again encouraged the Europeans to consolidate their 
alliance. They established the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, which was - essentially a managed-float system. Its goal was to secure an area of monetary stability in 










Mechanism (ERM), which connected European currencies and specified a maximum amount of 
fluctuation between the members. Each state had a central rate calculated on the basis of the 
central rate of the European Currency Unit (ECU), a fictional European Currency supposed to 
exemplify European currencies as a whole.33 
The snake was a managed-float system: currencies would float against each other in a 
narrow band according to the market. Should a currency fall outside these limits, though, the 
central banks would intervene to push the currency back within bounds. If a currency had 
constant difficulty keeping its currency at the specified exchange rate, the central banks would 
recalculate the currency's value against the ECU. 
31 Andre Szasz, The Road to European Monetary Union, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 36-37. 




















The European Monetary System did not start out as a replacement for the Economic and 
Monetary Union. It lacked the authority to enforce economic policy restraints on members, for 
example. Due to EMS success throughout the 1980s, members of the European Community 
regained the notion of turning the system into a full economic and monetary union.34 
European Political Integration 
The major implication of establishing an economic and monetary union is that member 
countries finally attained the level of political integration that framers of the European 
Community (or even earlier, the European Coal and Steel Community) envisioned. As discussed 
in the first few sections of this paper, economic sovereignty plays a large role in political 
sovereignty. By allowing the European Central Bank to determine monetary policies such as 
exchange rates and fiscal policies such as interest rates, the member states cede a great deal of 
political authority to the Union. 
Part of the difficulty in converting to an economic and monetary union was that not all 
the members were members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Britain, for example, was not a 
member until 1990, and Greece was not until 1998.35 Their absence made the calculation of a 
European Currency Unit an untrue representation of European currencies. The Delors Plan, 
which set a three-stage process toward creating an economic and monetary union, sought to 
correct problems such as this. 
President of the European Commission from 1895-1995, Jacques Delors envisioned four 
goals for the European Community: 
• increasing EC revenue 













implementing firmer budgetary discipline 
reforming and nlaintaining stricter control over the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) 
increasing funds for the Cohesion Fund (to reduce the socio-economic gap 
between richest and poorest states), the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), called the "structural funds.,,36 
The Delors Report sought and economic unification more than previous reports. The three-stage 
process began on July 1, 1990 with the abolition of any controls on capital movement across 
state borders. In the second stage, beginning January 1, 1994, the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI) was established in order to coordinate central banks. Originally set to end in 1996, the 
final stage of unification consisted of conforming to a number of convergence criteria. At the 












Convergence criteria serve to mollify any shock the members might suffer in converting 
to a single currency by bringing potential members into closer economic accord. Specifically, a 
state must meet four standards in order to join the union: 
• It must control inflation such that it is not more than 1.5% higher than the member 
with the lowest inflation rate. 
• It must reduce budget deficits to 3% or less of GDP and the public debt must not 
exceed 60% of GDP. Its exchange rate must remain within the 2.25% band for 
two years before becoming a member. 
• Its interest rate must not differ by more than 2 % from that of the state with the 
lowest interest rate.38 
So far, eleven states have met the criteria and are currently converting to the single currency: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain. (See Figure 5, "Maastricht Criteria and European Union map.)39 
36 Lucarelli, p. 146. 
37 Lucarelli, p. 146. 



















Figure 5 Maastricht Criteria 
Belgium 























'. '. . -
Economic Indicators and the Maastricht Treaty Convergence Criteria 
1995 -1997 
General 
Intlation4 Long-tenn interest government 
rateD lending (+) or 
borrowing (--: 
1995 *** 1.4 *** 7.5 -3.9 
1996 1.S 6.5 -3.2 
1997 1.4 5.7 # -2.1 
1995 2.3 S.3 # -2.4 
1996 2.1 7.2 # -0.7 
1997 1.9 6.2 # 0.7 
1995 1.5 6.9 -3.3 
1996 1.2 6.2 -3.4 
1997 1.4 5.6 # -2.7 
1995 9.0 17.4 -9.S 
1996 7.9 14.4 -7.5 
1997 5.2 9.S -4.0 
1995 4.7 11.3 -6.4 
1996 3.6 8.7 -4.6 
1997 I.S 6.3 # -2.6 
1995 1.7 7.5 -5.0 
1996 2.1 6.3 -4.1 
1997 ** 1.2 5.5 # -3.0 
1995 2.4 8.3 # -2.1 
1996 2.2 7.3 # -0.4 
1997 *** 1.2 *** 6.2 # 0.9 
1995 5.4 12.2 -8.0 
1996 4.0 9.4 -6.7 
1997 1.8 6.7 # -2.7 
1995 1.9 7.6 # 2.0 
1996 *** 1.2 *** 6.3 # 2.5 
1997 1.4 5.6 # 1.7 
1995 l.l ** 6.9 -4.0 
1996 1.4 6.2 # -2.3 
1997 1.8 5.5 # -1.4 
1995 2.0 7.1 -5.1 
1996 * 1.8 6.3 -4.0 
1997 * l.l * 5.6 # -2.5 
1995 3.8 11.5 -5.8 
1996 2.9 8.6 -3.2 
1997 1.8 6.2 # -2.5 
1995 * 1.0 * 8.8 -5.0 
1996 ** l.l ** 7.1 -3.3 
1997 * 1.3 5.9 # -0.9 
1995 2.9 10.2 -7.1 
1996 * 0.8 * 8.0 -3.5 
1997 1.9 6.5 # -0.8 
1995 3.1 8.3 -5.5 
1996 2.5 7.9 -4.8 
1997 1.8 7.0 # -1.9 
ll)t}:- 2.7 1J.7 ·J.II 
19W1 2.:- 1J.1 -J.II 
IIJI)7 1.7 7.9 -,\.11 
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Besides the political aspect of economic integration, the Delors Report called for 
strengthening of political ties by giving more power to the European Parliament (EP). 
Although the European Parliament had been in existence since the European Coal and Steel 
Community, it had acted more as an advisory body than a true decision-making body. Increasing 
EP power was one of the ways European policymakers expressed a clear desire for political 
integration during the two-month summit in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Although debates were 
often heated, the summit produced the February 1992 Treaty on European lTnion (TEU). The 
treaty strengthened the Parliament's powers of scrutiny and monitoring. It also bestowed the 
power to investigate complaints of misadministration against European institutions.4o 
In Treaty on European Union, often called the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council 
also formally established the European Union. The Union would not only the economic 
element of the European Community and the political element of the European Parliament, but 
two new "pillars," as they were called. The Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were the newest branches of the European Union, added by 
the Maastricht Treaty.41 
According to the timeline set for monetary integration, by June 30, 1997, all member 
states passed legislation necessary to establish the euro as a currency. The Exchange Rate 
Mechanism indexed member countries' currencies according to the euro. During the spring of 
1998, the heads of state in Europe determined whether they would participate in the single 
39 Source: European Monetary Institute, Progress towards Convergence - 1996, Table A, pg. IV and Annual Report; 
Eurostat; DGEP; DGAERI; and September 1997 Report of Excessive Deficits. Online. 
http://www.dgep.ptlctconvergenceOI.html 
Chart symbols: * ** ***= first, second, and third best performers in terms of price stability. 
#= public debt not exceeding 3% of GDP, public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP. 
a= for 1996 and 1997. b= In percentages, annual average; in 1997, 12-month average. 
c= as percentage of GDP. d= Ireland was not the subject of an EU Council decision under Article 104c (6) of the 
Treaty on an excessive deficit exists. In 1996 this was also the case for Denmark. 
40 The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.v. "European Parliament." 
.. McCurry 29 
- currency. Later that year, the Council of Ministers of the member states created the European 
Central Bank and appointed its executive board. Production of euro bank notes and coins began, .. 
and any remaining legislative problems were addressed.42 
- By January 1, 1999, currency exchange rates were set irrevocably in relation to the euro. 
The euro became the currency of foreign exchange operations. Currently, the banking and .. 
finance industries are in the process of changing to the euro, and are scheduled to finish by 
- January 2002. Member states are working on moving the entire econon1Y, including habituating 
their citizens, to the new currency. January 1, 2002 is the date earmarked for the first circulation - of euro bank notes and coins. For six months, the euro will exist alongside national currencies. 
- After July 1, however, the legal tender status of individual currencies will be cancelled.43 
The European Union has moved a long way from the separate states that characterized -
Europe before and during W orId War II. The most visible trend in European integration is that 
- economics provided the impetus for political integration. Early attempts at economic integration, 
such as the European Coal and Steel Community, failed due to the fact that there was not greater -
political cohesion between the members. Without the authority to harmonize policies indirectly 
.. related to trade (transportation and agriculture, for example), unions that were strictly economic 
in scope had difficulty surviving. It proved impossible to deal with economic sectors separately -
from political sectors. 
- While political integration was not quick to catch on, framers of each successive union 
.. set European political integration as their goal. As early as the European Coal and Steel 
Community, framers realized that an economic alliance would necessarily force states to 
-
_ 41 The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.y. "TEU." 
.. 
.. 
42 European Commission "Euro Website: One Money for Europe," http://europa.eu.intleurolhtmllentry.html 





















harmonize their policies.44 France's prime minister counted on that fact when he stated that there 
was no way Germany and France could wage war against each other if engaged in an economic 
alliance over coal and steeL 
American Political Integration 
According to Peter H. Smith, the history of Latin American-US relations is composed of 
three major periods, the "Imperial Era, Stretching from the 1790s through the 1930s; the Cold 
War, lasting from the late 1940s through the late 1980s; and the current era, [which he has] 
called the Age of Uncertainty, starting in the 1990s.,,45 While this essay will focus mainly on the 
latter two periods, Smith's first period lays the foundation for looking at the United States when 
writing about Latin An1erica. With such a long history of political relations, whether 
exemplified by mutual agreements between the United States and Latin American States or by 
instances in which the United States exercises control, discourse on Latin America would be 
incomplete if it did not address the US role in Latin American affairs. 
There are two main ways to interpret the US role in regional affairs: 1) a power-hungry 
oppressor that forces pan-American integration or 2) a mere participant in pan-American 
integration. The first interpretation holds that the United States acts as a self-interested global 
power, reigning over its weaker neighbors and subjecting them to its political whims. According 
to this theory, the United States forces integration onto the Latin American states, or at least 
forced them into a collectivity and set itself as the head of the group. The other interpretation 
44 The word "harmonize" has a specific meaning in International Relations discourse. What it does not indicate is 
peaceful coexistence between the policies of two entities. Rather, harmonizing indicates the process by which states 
(or other actors) work to bring conflicting policies into accord with one another. While this difference may seem 
subtle, it underlines the fact that "harmonizing" is not an easy task to undertake. In the case of Europe, it required 
adapting staunchly opposing policies to a central norm. (April Morgan, Introduction to International Relations 
lecture, Fall 1999, University of Tennessee.) 
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- views integration as a desire of Latin American states. The second theory posits that Latin 
American States envisioned a united Western Hemisphere, although they sometimes hesitated to - invite the United States. Their hesitancy emerged from the fear that the United States would try 
- to establish itself as a domineering power in the organization. 
In support of the first argument, the United States began its quest to secure a sphere of - influence in Latin America as early as the Imperial Era. Smith interprets this phenomenon as an 
- exanlple of balance-of-power politics. He holds that the United States acquired such a region of 
special interest in order to counter the spheres of influence that every other major power, - especially European states, had at the time.46 While the United States did not need Latin 
- American resources or labor, it understood the military importance of controlling its neighbors to 
the South. The United States did not fear invasion by Latin America specifically, but rather -
worried that a rival European power would claim these areas. By formalizing its presence in 
- Latin America, the United States could control European presence there. 
One point in support of this explanation is that Cuba has long been a coveted military -
base. The early United States did not worry that Spain, a weak European power at the time, 
- would challenge the United States.47 Rather, the United States feared that a stronger European 
state, such as England or France, would take Cuba from Spain. Beginning with this nineteenth-
century fear and extending to fear of the Soviet Union half a century ago, the United States has 
- always struggled to control the island so as not to have a strong military enemy only ninety miles 
off its coast. -
... 
45 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford UP: 1996), 
- p.321. 
46 Ibid., p. 325. 























If one follows this interpretation of inter-American relations, Latin America had only a 
few possible responses to rising US power. The first, in line with Simon Bolivar's pan-
Americanism, was to hope for a unified continent in which the United States would not dominate 
the other states. Those who suspected their northern neighbor of imperialistic aims considered 
forging an alliance with a power outside the hemisphere. Certain states, in particular Argentina 
and Brazil, entertained the notion of becoming the regional hegemon. Latin American states 
were culturally inclined to resist US pressure, but, in essence, they were too weak politically to 
stop the giant. Latin America had little true choice but to endure US presence in its affairs.48 
According to this theory, the groundwork of integration in the Americas lay in US 
attempts to stave off other world powers. Those who directed the first steps of American 
integration did not concern themselves with the political aspirations of Latin American states. 
Their objective was more along the lines of securing Latin America for the United States in order 
to keep Europe from doing so. By closing the door to European intervention, US policymakers 
took an important step to protect US sovereignty. 49 
On the other hand, the second interpretation of inter-American relations offers a different 
perspective. Both the United States and Latin American states sought to expel European power 
from the Western Hemisphere. Edmund Gaspar notes that important figures along the timeline 
of US history recognized the "common destiny,,50 of the North and Latin America. Earliest, 
George Washington mentioned common destiny in his final address, Thomas Jefferson and John 
48 Ibid., p. 322. 
49 Ibid., p. 51. 
50 Edmund Gaspar, United States-Latin America: A Special Relationship? (Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Studies: 1978), p. 22. 
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- Quincy Adams expanded the concept into a notion of hemispheric isolationism, and James 
Monroe included elements of common destiny in his 1823 address to Congress. 51 
- The second interpretation of early inter-American relations points out, correctly, that the 
- United States saw Latin America as a group of nations emerging from the same plight it had 
recently escaped. Recently out of European control themselves, US policymakers felt that - Europe had no place in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. Latin American 
_ scholars looked to literature on US independence as a source of inspiration. They hoped the 
spirit of independence would stimulate their own nationals to revolt against European authorities. - The truth about the beginnings of American integration probably lies between the two 
- interpretations. The United States clearly rejected European influence in the West and advocated 
expelling strong European forces from the Hemisphere. On the other hand, the United States -
probably acted more in its own self-interest than in the interest of Latin American states. 
- Any denial that the United States did not serve its own interests over those of Latin 
America are idealistic when one considers the number of times the United States intervened in -
Latin America in order to affect a certain outcome. From just before the tum of the nineteenth 
- century to 1934, the United States initiated over thirty military operations in Latin America. 
(See Figure 6, HUS Military Interventions in the Caribbean Basin, 1898-1934.) Secretary of -
State Richard Olney declared in 1895 that "the United States is practically sovereign on this 
- continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.,,52 Military 
- interventions ranged from short missions like the one in Mexico to operations of eight years in 
the Dominican Republic (1916 to 1924), nineteen years in Haiti (1915 to 1934), and twenty-five 
- years in Nicaragua (1909 to 1934). 
- 51 Ibid. 
52 Rosati, p. 25. 
-
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- In response to US military involvement in Latin America, Gaspar states, "the assumption 
underlying the original theory of hemispheric unity was that the newly independent American - states were bound together by a common belief in the republican-democratic ideal." Most Latin 























1913, 1914, 1916-1917, 1918-1919 
1898, 1899, 1909-1910, 1912-1925, 1926-1933 
1903-1914,1921,1925 
Source: Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, p. 53. 
_ corrupt autocrats had no intention of honoring their democratic claims, the United States sought 
to intervene on behalf of Latin Americans who continued to champion democracy. Despite US - efforts, intervention failed to institute stable economies or stable democracies in Latin America. 
- On the other hand, intervention incited distrust of the United States and dislike of its imposing 
power.53 -
Gaspar's opinion that the United States' true intention was to bolster stable democracies 
- in Latin America is problematic. Several elements voice the former argument. Policies of three 
US Presidents offer support for the view of the United States as a hegemony-seeking power: -
• The Monroe Doctrine, 1823 
- • Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick Policy, 1901 
53 Gaspar, p. 23. 
-
-
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- • William Taft's Dollar Diplomacy, and, later, 1909-1913 
In his December 2, 1823 address to Congress, James Monroe laid the foundation for US 
- policy toward Latin America. Those who choose to see the United States as a benevolent big 
















interposition for the purpose of oppressing [the newly independent nations], or controlling in any 
other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of 
an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." It was the first formal statement designating 
Latin America as an area off limits for Europeans. The purpose of keeping European 
colonization out, however, was not for the benefit of Latin American populations, but for the 
benefit of expansionist-minded policymakers in the United States. By determining that no 
outside power had authority to intervene in Latin America, Monroe essentially verbalized the 
opinion that the United States had the authority to dictate affairs of Latin America. 
Teddy Roosevelt fashioned the Roosevelt Corollary around Monroe Doctrine principles. 
On September 2, 1901, he quoted one of his favorite African proverbs, which came to be known 
as his foreign policy philosophy: "Speak softly and carry a big stick." In this mindset, Roosevelt 
clearly reiterated that the United States would not support European intervention in Latin 
American Affairs.54 
Once again, the US president's policy seemed to chanlpion democracy in Latin America. 
The "Big Stick" policy, however, was not a selfless attempt to protect Latin America. Roosevelt 
had no reservations about supporting the Latin American regime that most benefited the United 
States. When American leaders strongly desired a canal to connect the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
Roosevelt engineered a way to produce that result. He did not hesitate to urge and support 





















quickly recognized Panama as an independent country and acquired the Panama Canal site in 
1903.55 
William Howard Taft's policies differed from Roosevelt's strategy of beginning an 
insurgency. He sought to spread US influence through trade and investment, hence the term 
"Dollar Diplomacy." Where this doctrine came at odds with Latin American sovereignty was in 
his use of military force on their territory_ When conflict erupted between Nicaragua and 
Honduras, he quickly dispatched troops to protect US nationals and property. Realistically, 
Taft's action was to protect US business and investment interests.56 
Under the administration of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, the United States 
supposedly abandoned such policies of n1ilitary intervention in the 1920s and 1930s. The most 
dramatic rejection of former practices was Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy. Instead of 
claiming Latin America as a sphere of influence, he opened the Monroe Doctrine up to include 
Latin America in a security plan. The two would take joint action against aggressors. 57 While 
there were markedly less military interventions into Latin America, the United States did 
undertake at least five missions while the Good Neighbor policy was in effect. 
Pursuing US interests in Latin America would remain an act of militant control in the 
next era. The United States had infringed on Latin America's sovereignty during the Imperial 
Era by leaving it few options of escape from US hegemony. That level of infringement even 
multiplied during the Cold War Era, when the United States became even more adamant about 
the Latin American policies it would allow. Following W orId War II, mutual fears between the 
54 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amexlpresidents/nf/record/tr/trooseveltfp.html 
55 Rosati, p. 25. 
56 http://www. pbs.org/wgbh/amexlpresidents/nf/record/taftltaftfp .html 
57 Rosati, p. 25. 
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- United States and Soviet Union translated into a tight grasp on their respective spheres of 
influence. - First and foremost, Washington demanded loyalty to the principle of democracy. The 
.. United States scrutinized Latin America for Soviet supporters, just as it did within its borders 
during the McCarthy Red Scare. Subverting everything, even the sovereignty of other states, to - its national interest, the United States was crafty in efficiently putting down any organization it 
- deemed dangerous. (Figure 7 provides a list of US military missions in Latin America from the 
Cold War to the 1990s.) Washington decreed covert operations to undermine non-democratic -
regimes and to bolster friendly governments. Anti-communism was at the foundation of every 










Figure 7 US Military Intervention in Latin America 
Since World War II 
1954, Guatemala: The CIA organizes the overthrow of the government. 
1961, Cuba: Attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs. 
1965, Donlinican Republic: Johnson sends 22,000 troops to combat the forces trying to regain 
power. 
1973, Chile: The CIA helps overthrow the government of Allende in Chile. 
1981, Nicaragua: The Reagan Administration begins the Contra War. 
1983, Grenada: US invasion of Grenada. 
1989, Panama: US invasion to arrest accused drug dealer Manual Noriega. 
1990, Nicaragua: US intervention in the Nicaraguan election. 
1994, Haiti: US military action against the nlilitary and police junta of C6dras and Fran~ois. 
Source: Latin American Solidarity Homepage.)~ 
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With the fall of communism and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States 
no longer needed to hold Latin America in a political grip. This situation allowed room for 
another type of interaction with Latin America: an economic as opposed to political interaction. 
In the post-World War II era, the United States retained its previous status as the economic giant 
of the Western Hemisphere. Whereas the US had faced economic challenge from outside the 
hemisphere-from the USSR's challenge to capitalism and from Europe's rapid economic 
advances (largely resulting from the European Recovery Program)-no Latin American state 
grew to challenge the United States economically. 
Despite the fact that the United States strongly advocated and even demanded that 
Western Europe engage in trade liberalization and economic integration, the United States was 
slow to implement these policies in the Americas. It did not seek to integrate with Latin 
American states, basing its economy more on trade with Western Europe. The reason for such a 
decision was probably based on the fact that US policymakers felt that Western Europe had 
higher potential: Europe was heavily industrialized, had long-standing democratic governments, 
and had been the world's economic center for centuries. Latin American states, on the other 
hand, had few industrialized cities, had difficulty sustaining stable democracies, and had never 
enjoyed the prosperous status of Europe. While recent events, namely the war's destruction of 
European industry and Europe's bout with fascism would seem to offset this balance, it seemed 
clear to policymakers that Europe would quickly recover, but Latin America would continue to 
struggle. 
Because the United States did not engage in trade agreements with Latin America, in the 
1950s, Latin American states initiated a number of free trade alliances and common markets 
59 Latin American Solidarity Homepage, http://www.ukans.edulcwis/organizations/las/las.html. presents an anti-US 




















between themselves. The states looked to the integration occurring in Europe as an example. 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) encouraged the 
practice of import substitution6o. The states set up preferential trade agreements as a way to 
escape the small-market problem discussed earlier. Through these practices, states and industries 
could attain economies of scale and citizens could benefit from efficiency in the market. 61 
Four main trade agreenlents emerged in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s: 
• Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), 1960 (replaced by the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980: 
• Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela Central American Common Market (CACM), 1960: 
• Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. Caribbean Free Trade 
Association, 1965 (replaced by the Caribbean Community, or "Caricom" in 1973): 
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
• Andean Pact (AP), 1969: 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and (later) Venezuela62 
Each of these agreements followed the same pattern of integration, but some with more 
intensity than others. The first, and easiest stage consisted of import substitution. During that 
stage, trade expanded rapidly within the region. However, after that step, the process of 
integration slowed rapidly as the debt crisis of the 1970s put pressure on the members. By the 
early 1980s, advancement in each alliance drew to a standstill. Not one of the four alliances had 
expanded enough to be the dominant market: "intra-regional market shares peaked at 26 percent 
(1970) in CACM, 14 percent (1975-1980) in LAFTAILAIA and 4.8 percent (1988) in the AP.,,63 
Saborio explains the fate of these trade agreements: 
60 Import substitution is the practice of imposing high tariffs on imports. This practice allows for domestic 
companies to produce the goods that were once imported. That is to say, they substitute foreign-produced goods for 
domestically produced goods. (Kreinin, p 207.) 
61 Sylvia Saborio, "The Long and Winding Road from Anchorage to Patagonia," The Premise and the Promise: Free 
Trade in the Americas, ed. Sylvia Saborio, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992), p. 15 . 
62 Ibid., p. 15-6. 
63 Ibid., 16 . 






































The agreements ultimately failed because import-substitution activities did not develop 
the efficiency necessary to propel the process forward. The pattern of industrial 
protection induced activities that were typically capital- and import-intensive, generating 
neither the domestic value added nor the foreign exchange necessary to become self-
sustaining. Efforts to rationalize the process usually failed because the removal of trade 
barriers-both intra-regional and external-was typically a highly selective, discretionary 
affair that invariably fell prey to the vested interests of import competing groups. Over 
time, macroeconomic policy became increasingly hemmed in by inconsistencies in the 
model-in particular the chronic fiscal and external deficits-until it too imploded, along 
with the debt crisis in the early 1980s. On top of these intrinsic inconsistencies is the 
basic model, the regional agreements also lacked adequate institutional mechanisms for 
settling disputes and remedying enforcement lapses.64 
While the arrangements did not dominate Latin American markets, they did foster industrial 
growth and aid in diversifying exports produced.65 
In the 1980s, economic integration again gained popularity in the Americas. Several 
principles changed the nature of the alliances. First, the guiding philosophy for the refigured 











would add much-needed capital and technology to the region, as well as provide outlets for 
products manufactured there. Second, the market, as opposed to policy interventions, would 
determine resource allocation. Finally, instead of implementing policy in a piecemeal fashion 
with individual members, the alliances preferred "across-the-board, automatic measures" that 
would apply to all members of the pact. 66 
The Andean Pact, the first coalition to implement the new trade philosophy, underwent 
revision in 1989. Members decided to convert their alliance into a free trade area by 1995 and 
further integration into a common market by 1997. Given early success, member states agreed to 
move deadlines to 1992 and 1993. Similarly, members of the Central American Common 
Market opened their borders to free movements of goods produced within the region. By the end 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 









of 1992, even agricultural products, often one of the most difficult products to pass legislation, 
were allowed to cross borders. By 1994 the states had adopted a common external tariff. The 
Caribbean Community (Caricom) expedited its trade liberalization practices in 1990. In general, 
the states have been successful in their integration efforts.67 
Mercosur, the "Southern Cone Common Market," began in 1991. The framers of the 
Treaty of Asuncion, Mercosur's founding document, agreed to eliminate nearly all tariff and 
nontariff barriers. Their goal was to implement a common market by 1995. 
Latin America was not the only region in the Western Hemisphere to embark on trade 
liberalization initiatives during this time. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States increasingly 











Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CAFT A). Mexico joined the agreement in 1994, changing 
the group to the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A). 
Many find the US change of policy to economic integration unclear. One hypothesis 
holds that US policymakers, frustrated by the slow advancement of GATT policies, sought to 
increase markets for US goods by raising the level of trade and investment in their two closest 
neighbors. Canada already held the position of the United States' largest trading partner and 
Mexico was third.68 
The fact that the United States already engaged in high levels of trade with Canada and 
Mexico also provided for an alternative hypothesis. The second theory holds that the United 
States' unhurried advance toward trade liberalization resulted from the fact that the United States 
understood how little opening trade with Canada and Mexico would affect its economy. Barriers 






















trade flows that did not already exist. In fact, data show that trade between Canada and the 
United States actually decreased in the first few years after establishing CAFf A. 69 
Similarities between the economies of the United States and Canada were likely to reduce 
even more the possible impact of trade liberalization between the two states. As Brown, 
Deardoff, and Stem explain, "studies suggesting that Canada's economic welfare might rise by 
90/0 or more seem to have been unduly optimistic." It seemed more likely that relaxing trade 
restrictions would do nothing to affect the standard of living in either state. Macroeconomic 
fluctuations proved to have a greater effect on the Canadian economy than reduced trade 
restrictions. 70 
Trade with Mexico was a very different case, however. While tariffs on Mexican goods 
were low, as with Canada, more non-tariff barriers hindered trade. Mexican goods faced tough 
standards and agriculture faced heavy restrictions at the US border. Relaxation of these policies 
could permit a large increase in trade between the two states. According to a study cited by 
Brown, Deardoff, and Stem, relaxation of non-tariff barriers against "textiles and steel alone 
would raise Mexico's exports of steel to the United States by 3,416.70/0 and Mexican welfare by 
2.8%.,,71 
Additionally, the difference between the economies of Mexico and the United States is 
much greater than that between the United States and Canada, as shown by Figure 8. Many 
economists on each side of the border hypothesize that adding Mexico into an alliance with its 
neighbors to the North would serve to raise its standard of living. This reasoning seems 
68 Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "North American Integration," The Economic 
Journal 102 (November 1992): 1507. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 1509. 
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Figure 8 ... 
Western Hemisphere: Basic Economic Indicators, 1990 
- Areal Population GOP GOP per Investment Trade per Inflation 
Country (millions) ($ billions) Capita ($) Per Cap ($) GOP (%) (0/0) 
NORTH AMERICA 276.4 5,999.00 21,706 3,595 23.8 -
United States 250 5,423.40 29,696 3,486 21.1 4.9 
Canada 26.4 575.6 29,803 4,628 50 5.7 -
LATIN AMERICA 431.9 840.5 1,946 378 30.7 1,186.30 
- LAIA 384 788.7 2,054 404 28.9 Mexico 88.6 175.5 1,980 463 38.9 29.9 
Chile 13.2 32.3 2,451 550 57.8 27.3 - Andean Pact 92.2 154.5 1,677 297 33.3 
Bolivia 7.3 6.4 870 79 28.4 18 - Colombia 33 46.7 1,416 285 30.5 32 Ecuador 10.6 13.2 1,249 284 37.8 49.5 
Peru 21.6 28.3 1,312 312 28.1 7,657.80 
Venezuela 19.7 60 3,038 389 37.5 36.5 -
Mercosur 190.1 426.4 2,244 418 20.9 
Argentina 32.3 84.8 2,623 226 23.1 1,343.90 .. 
Brazil 150.4 326.2 2,169 465 19 1,585.20 
Paraguay 4.3 6.4 1,493 366 55 44.1 
Uruguay 3.1 9 2,921 235 46.8 129 .. 
CENTRAL AMERICA 26.5 25.5 962 153 51.8 
Costa Rica 3 5.1 1,677 402 80.5 27.5 - EI Salvador 5.3 5.7 1,091 121 45.1 19.3 
Guatemala 9.2 8.2 892 114 40.2 59.6 
Honduras 5.1 4.5 880 114 47.7 36.4 - Nicaragua 3.9 2 505 149 54.8 13,490.90 
OTHER 21.2 23.8 1,120 189 73.1 - Barbados 0.3 1.5 5,835 1,141 94.2 3.4 Dominican Republic 7.2 5.1 716 157 81.4 100.7 
Guayana 0.8 0.4 554 142 146.9 n.a. - Haiti 6.5 2.1 324 35 37.5 26.1 Jamaica 2.5 3.5 1,401 412 108.6 29.7 
Panama 2.4 4.7 1,941 55 62.2 1.5 











especially valid when one considers the current labor situation in the two states. In 1991, twenty 
percent of Mexican workers were employed in the United States. Mexico's labor force was 
growing at a rate of five percent per year, while the United States' labor force was growing very 
slowly. Allowing the Mexican labor force to move north with less restriction would increase 
cash flows back to Mexico, raising the Mexican standard of living. 
In sum, liberalizing with Mexico will cause a greater impact than liberalizing trade with 
- Canada for two reasons: 1) US-Mexican trade has more room for liberalizing and 2) US and 














will not feel the impact to the same degree, though. Several features signify that the economic 
impact will be nluch greater for Mexico than for the United States. Most important is the fact 
that trade is not equally important between the two members. Even though Mexico holds the 
position of third largest trading partner with the United States, trade with Mexico comprises a 
small portion of the United States' GNP. For that matter, the entire gross domestic product of 
Mexico is only 3.2 percent of US GDP. On the other hand, exports to the United States comprise 
a significant portion of Mexican GNP, so trade liberalization would greatly affect the Mexican 
economy. 
Mexican economists see a trade agreement with the United States as a step in the 
direction of economic improvement. Because of this sentiment, Mexico was responsible for 
initiating most trade negotiations with the United States. The United States did find several 
aspects of trade liberalization with Mexico appealing. US policymakers were attracted to cheap 
resources. Businesses found cheap raw materials and a cheap, rapidly growing labor supply two 
appealing benefits from lowered trade boundaries. Finally, US politicians desired to "strengthen 
- McCurry 47 
.. democratic institutions along [the] borders, control illegal immigration, and facilitate drug 
interdiction."n 
- Whatever its true reasons for going along with the plan for integrating North America 
- into a free trade agreement, the United States has not been without opposition from within. 
Labor unions fear the loss of American jobs to low-wage Mexican workers. Politicians such as 
Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan popularized this notion just before the inception of NAFT A. They 
- warned of a "giant sucking sound" of American jobs flowing south to Mexico. 
During the process of trade liberalization with Mexico, the notion of opening US borders 
-
to free trade with all of Latin America or South America has been unheard of. Opposition has 
- been strong against adding Mexico, which ranks among the better performing states in GDP per 
capita and investment per capita. (Its GDP per capita ranks ninth of the twenty-four states -
counted and only five of the twenty-four have a higher investment per capita.) Latin America73 
- had twice the population of Canada and .the United States combined by 1990, yet Latin 
America's GDP was less than one seventh of US gross domestic product. From a US -
perspective, such statistics dispel the very idea of pan-American trade liberalization. Whereas 
- the strong US economy might be able to stand the shock of incorporating the relatively small 
Mexican economy, it certainly could not support all of Latin America at once. -
Outside the United States, Latin America has made a great deal of progress in setting up 
- regional trade agreements. Part of this phenomenon, again, originates from small-state desires to 
- tap larger markets and attain economies of scale. States, however, have not suggested a union 
-
72 Ibid. 1507. 
- 73 Statistic includes population estimates for Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Barbados, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, panama, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
-
-
- McCurry 48 
- with any more requirements than the common market. The likely reason that Latin America has 
not integrated to this point probably has to do with the politics of integration. 
- One cultural consistency among Latin American states is distaste of the US political 
- imperialism. They resent having a dominating power in the hemisphere to monitor them. 
Likewise, Latin American states are averse to the idea of ceding political power to a Latin - American entity. This cultural characteristic provides one explanation for Western Hemisphere 











deeper economic alliance than a common market, the states would have to engage in a political 
alliance they are not currently willing to forge. 
Conclusion: European Integration vs. American Integration 
Clearly, Europe has integrated at a pace unrivaled in the Americas. In the course of half 
a century, Europe has established one of the strongest economic and political junctions in the 
world. In the Americas, progress lags behind the stage Europe passed in the late 1950s. 
Furthemlore, America has not imitated the depth of European integration. While the European 
Union has implemented a method for punishing states that violate its demands the Americas have 
not established a hierarchical sovereign that can effectively punish members. The cases of Haiti 
in the early 1990s and Austria in 2000 prove this point. 74 
There are several reasons that the two blocs integrated differently. In both cases an 
outside impetus for integration, namely the United States, prodded the region toward integration. 
First, the early United States pressed Latin America into a collective group by insisting that no 
74The cases of Austria and Haiti demonstrate this point. When the EU community disagreed with the rise of Joerg 
Haider's Freedom Party early in 2000, the fourteen other members of the euro zone imposed sanctions against 
- Austria. On the other hand, the OAS was not able to enforce sanctions against Haiti in 1992 when US President 






















strong European power be allowed in the region. These were the first demonstrations of the 
United States shaping Latin American destiny. Throughout the Cold War, the United States' 
political control over Latin America increased. Many argue that the United States overstepped 
its bounds, infringing upon other states' sovereignty when it determined to depose certain rulers 
and tailor Latin American governments to its own needs. 
Next, US pressure to integrate Europe became more explicit in Europe. Given that 
Europe had recently fought the most destructive war in history and that the Soviet Union posed a 
perceived threat to democracy, the United States felt that political and economic integration were 
legitimate demands to make. An economic alliance over valuable resources would not only 
make it impossible for European powers to wage a war against each other, it would encourage 
policymakers to harmonize political issues between them. The reasoning was that an economic 
alliance would lead to a political alliance. Once European states attained a high level of 
integration in the two fields, it would be impossible for them to break apart in order to challenge 
each other. 
More important during the era, a close economic and political relationship between the 
member states made infiltration of communism less of a threat. During the time of poverty after 
World War's destruction, government officials began to worry that a discontent populace would 
tum to communism. Hungry and exhausted from the war, people might seek solace in a system 
that emphasized equal access to resources for everyone. Actions of this sort were fresh on the 
minds of Europeans: Germany and Italy had fostered undemocratic regimes in the recent past. 
To stave off such an action, European and US officials felt that building strong democracies 
would repel the popular attractions of such a system. 






















As for political integration in the European states, framers of the Maastricht Treaty had a 
difficult time agreeing which country would retain its domestic policies and which ones would 
be forced to change. Successive economic unions had collapsed because of unwillingness to 
conform to region-wide standards. Therefore, if the framers were to create a system in which 
they could further reap the benefits of trade arrangements they had made, it was necessary to 
establish a political system that would endure through the difficult policy choices. 
The pattern of integration in Europe, therefore, was that economic factors pushed 
political factors. Not until Europe discovered the benefits of trade liberalization were Europeans 
anxious to institute political integration. That pattern did not hold true for Latin America, 
however. Political factors (namely, hegemony on the part of the United States) led to the first 
wave of economic integration. However, as exemplified by the relatively low level of 
integration that persists, the political pressures were not extremely effective in establishing 
integration. In fact, the effects of social phenomena possibly contributed more to the integration 
of Latin America than any political ideal. For example, distaste of US prodding probably unified 
Latin Americans more than US demands. 
From these two cases, my deduction is that integration is more likely when states pursue 
economic benefits than when their goal is purely political. While Europe's economic integration 
was extremely rapid, political integration required much more time and effort. Economic efforts 
were realized as early as the late 1960s, yet true political advances took until the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Many Europeans are still wary about ceding power to an authority higher than their 
state. Not wanting to compromise their political and cultural autonomy, they proclaim that they 
do not want a "United States of Europe.,,75 





















That said, will Latin America continue to integrate to the point that Europe has attained? 
While it is nearly impossible to predict the future and there are many more factors to consider, 
my assessment is that Latin American integration will depend on the success of Europe's 
economic and monetary union. For many years, the United States has held a strong trading 
relationship with Western European states. In the past few years, however, the Europe has begun 
to become less important. In the past few years, the United States' largest trading partners have 
been Canada, Japan, and then Mexico. Europe currently holds fourth place, but continues to fall 
in percentage of trade it captures in the United States. Given that the economics seems to be the 
strongest driving force for integration, the fact that the United States no longer carries on as 
much trade with Europe could provide the momentum for Latin American integration. 
The European Union already includes a larger population and larger total GDP than the 
United States, even excluding the states that have not adopted the single currency. (See Figure 
9.) As cross-border trade in Europe becomes easier, the US market may become a less-attractive 
option for exporters in Europe. Since they would not have to pay tariffs or high transportation 
costs, Italian producers would be able to sell goods cheaper in other European states than in the 
United States. They could also offer their products at a lower price than US producers, who 
would have to contend with tariffs and transportation costs. Given these economic 
considerations, the United States may be phased out of trade with Europe to a degree that harms 
the United States. Seeing the economic benefits of a closer union with its Southern neighbors, 
the United States may again push for integration. 
Before diving into an economic union with Latin America, however, the United 
States must consider the effect of integrating with states that do not have similar economies. 














Strict convergence criteria ensure that one member does not threaten the welfare of the other 
members. In the case of the United States and Canada, however, the economic differential is 
Figure 9 How Large is the Euro Zone? 
Euro Zone EU USA Japan 
Population (millions) 290 374 268 126 
Geographic area (sq. miles) 910,000 1,300,000 3,720,000 150,000 
GDP (billions) 6,309 8,093 7,819 4,223 
GDP per capita ($) 21,600 21,600 29,200 33,500 
Source: Christian N. Chabot, Understanding the Euro: The Clear and Concise Guide to the New Trans-
European Economy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), p. 16. 
much greater. (See Figure 8.) The per capita GDP of Venezuela, one of the Latin American 
states with relatively high GDPs, is only a tenth of US GDP per capita. The European Union has 
reserved the right to reject members from the single currency alliance if they could not improve 
their economies to a certain minimum standard. Latin American states would fail these tests of 
economic strength. 
If the Western Hemisphere implemented an economic union, the US government would 
have to address the fact that, with a population of over 432 billion and unemployment over ten 
_ percent, that forty three billion Latin Americans might flock to the United States and Canada. 
Even more could migrate to the United States in hopes of better living conditions, medical care, .. 
and education. It would be impossible for the Canadian and US governments to accommodate a 
- sudden influx of this magnitude. 
Latin American states eagerly welcome US participation in an economic alliance, since -
US involvement would provide a large market of wealthy consumers. However, a precondition 




















economIes. Perhaps, through the trade liberalization that Latin America revived in the 1980s, 
they will see a vast expansion in economic growth. While expansion would probably require a 
longer time than did Europe after World War II, substantial economic growth may be possible. 
For instance, all Latin American states except Paraguay experienced economic growth during 
1997 and 1998. 
Unless such economic improvement occurs, creating an obvious benefit for the United 
States to further integrate with Latin America, it is unlikely that the United States will seek 
further integration with all Latin American states. In a 1994 summit on Western Hemisphere 
integration, for example, the United States demonstrated its unwillingness to join in a tight 
alliance. The United States pushed the deadline for ending talks on the subject to 2005, and that 
date was set only after Latin American pressure.76 
As for Latin America, integration will likely continue. Integration seems to be a 
beneficial action. Latin American states often criticize the United States for not proceeding with 
reciprocating their trade liberalization, especially after the United States strongly advocated trade 
liberalization when it sought Latin American markets. 
Europe has gone through the brunt of its appropriations for the common currency. The 
public is divided as to whether the union will fail or whether it will get stronger. Since its 
inception, the euro has fallen under the exchange rate of the dollar, and, pointing out its 
weaknesses, states like the United Kingdom are reluctant to join. Based on the fact that there is 
already a high-level of economic integration in Europe that seems to foster growth for the 
members, my opinion is that the EU euro zone will be a successful union. 
76 James Brooke, "On Even of Miami Summit Talks, U.S. Comes Under Fire," New York Times, December 8, 



















The summit on Western Hemisphere integration in 2005 is likely to contain pivotal 
decisions about these issues. At that point, the euro will have been in effect for three years, long 
enough to gain early insight into the success of the monetary union. Latin America will have had 
a few more years to bolster its individual economies, and the effects of Mercosur, which may 
tum out to be the strongest economic union in Latin and South America, will be clear. At this 
time, if Europe has experienced progress that makes trade with the United States less important, 
and if Latin America has experienced economic development that makes it a target market for 
the United States, my prediction is that the United States will engage in further trade 
liberalization with Latin America. It is unlikely that the United States would open its borders to 
a high-level economic pact such as a common market or economic union, but chances are greater 
that it might begin liberalization by initiating a hemisphere-wide free trade area. 
